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Introduction: the factivity constraint and the strong previous awareness condition 
In this report, I present new data bearing on two constraints that are often taken to be 
essential features of our ordinary use of ‘remembering’ and ‘having a memory’: the factivity 
constraint and the strong previous awareness condition.1 Let me introduce these two 
constraints in turn. 
The factivity constraint. The first constraint on the ordinary use of ‘remember’ is the so-
called factivity constraint. Werning and Cheng write: “It is […] widely agreed that 
‘remember’ comes with a presupposition of the factivity of the intentional object that the 
state referred to by ‘remember’ is directed to.” (2017: 8). Put simply, the claim is that one can 
                                               
1 My discussion in this report is limited to applicability of these two constraints to ascriptions of autobiographic 
episodic memories. 
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be truly said to ‘remember’ some event only if that person originally experienced or observed 
that event (e.g. Holland 1954; Malcolm 1963; Martin & Deutscher 1966; Chisholm 1989; 
Bernecker 2008). Any non-factive use of ‘remember’ then is said to be a mistaken or 
figurative attribution of memory. 
There are some dissenting voices, however. For example, Hazlett claims that non-factive 
“uses of ‘knows’, ‘learns’, ‘remembers’, and ‘realizes’ are unexceptional, and do not strike 
ordinary people as deviant” (2010: 501) while de Brigard argues that 
Perhaps the most obvious argument against the factivity constraint is the 
simple fact that competent speakers just don’t abide by it when they use the 
word ‘remembering’ […] The distinction between seeming to remember 
and actually remembering only makes sense from the point of view of 
epistemology, but this is because the philosopher has already confined her 
notion of remembering to veridical memories—a decision that isn’t 
grounded in the way competent speakers use the word ‘remembering’. 
(2017: 130-131) 
The strong previous awareness condition – the second constraint discussed in this report – 
states that remembering presupposes identity between the person who remembers an event 
and the person who originally experienced that event. 
In the present form and under the present label, this constraint was articulated by Sydney 
Shoemaker in his discussion of quasi-memories, in his 1970 paper Persons and their pasts: 
Quasi-remembering, as I shall use the term, includes remembering as a 
special case. One way of characterizing the difference between quasi-
remembering and remembering is by saying that the former is subject to a 
weaker previous awareness condition than the latter. Whereas someone’s 
claim to remember a past event implies that he himself was aware of the 
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event at the time of its occurrence [i.e. remembering is subject to the strong 
previous awareness condition – V.D.], the claim to quasi-remember a past 
event implies only that someone or other was aware of it. (271). 
Shoemaker’s goal in introducing the notion of quasi-remembering – as well as Derek Parfit’s, 
who later adopted this term in his book Reasons and Persons (1984) – was to answer one of 
the most influential arguments against the memory criterion of personal identity. This 
argument – mostly associated with Joseph Butler – claims that it is not possible to analyze 
personal identity in terms of autobiographical memory, for the latter presupposes the former. 
The notion of quasi-memory was designed to provide a criterion of personal identity that both 
preserves the spirit of the memory criterion and avoids the circularity charge, since quasi-
memory does not presuppose that the person who quasi-remembers an event is the same 
person as the one who originally experienced that event. 
Thus understood, remembering is a species of quasi-remembering – all memories are quasi-
memories, but not all quasi-memories are memories. As described by Parfit, “ordinary 
memories are a sub-class of quasi-memories. They are quasi-memories of our own past 
experiences.” (1984: 219).2 With these definitions, according to Shoemaker, it is possible to 
“defend the spirit of the claim that memory is a criterion of personal identity” (1970: 281) by 
rewriting memory criterion as a quasi-memory criterion. 
Shoemaker hints at the possibility, however, that the ordinary sense of ‘remember’ is not 
bound by the strong previous awareness condition. In discussing this possibility, he 
introduces two senses of ‘remember’ – ‘remembers’ for a strong sense of remembering that 
presupposes the strong previous awareness condition and ‘rememberw’ for a weak sense of 
                                               
2 For similar purposes, Penelhum (1967) introduces a different term ‘retrocognition’, where 
retrocognition and memory constitute disjoined classes – no memory is retrocognition and no 
retrocognition is memory. Otherwise retrocognition does not differ from quasi-memories. 
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remembering, quasi-remembering being one version of weak remembering. Shoemaker then 
writes: “In the actual world, people remembers whatever they rememberw, and this makes it 
difficult to settle the question of whether it is the weak or the strong sense of "remember" that 
is employed in ordinary discourse.” (ibid.) Shoemaker then claims that if “in its ordinary use 
‘remember’ means ‘rememberw’”, then this would allow to defend not only the spirit but also 
the letter of the claim that memory is a criterion of personal identity (ibid.). 
There is a link between the strong previous awareness condition and the factivity constraint. 
Violation of the strong previous awareness condition constitutes a partial violation of the 
factivity constraint – “veridical quasi-memory” (Shoemaker 1970: 273) or “accurate quasi-
memory” (Parfit 1984: 219) preserves factivity concerning the quasi-remembered event and 
violates factivity concerning who was the subject of the original experience. 
In the present report, I discuss the results of a set of four studies conducted with Lithuanian 
participants, which collectively suggest that indeed the ordinary use of ‘remember’ and 
‘having a memory of’ is not bound by either the factivity constraint or the strong previous 
awareness condition. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first attempt to address 
empirically the question whether these two constraints are features of our ordinary concept of 
memory.   
 
Study 1. Quasi-memories and artificial memories 
Study 1 was designed to check whether study participants will consider cases of quasi-
remembering and cases of artificial memories as cases of remembering. If they do, this would 
constitute a violation of the factivity constraint (in case of artificial memory) and the strong 
previous awareness condition (in case of quasi-memory).  
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Participants. 291 undergraduate students at a Lithuanian university (78% females, 20% 
males, 2% chose ‘other / prefer not to answer’; mean age: 20.0; age SD =  2.85; age range 
18–51) took part in this pen-and-paper study. 
Materials. Three vignettes were constructed and presented in a between-subjects design: 
quasi-memory (referred as Q in the vignette below), artificial memory (A), and true memory 
(T) as a control condition. Differences between vignettes are presented in brackets. Original 
materials in Lithuanian language for all studies reported in this report can be obtained from 
the author. 
 
Imagine that it is now the year 2086 and scientists have invented a 
technology that allows one [to install human memories (for Q and T) / to 
create artificial memories and to install such memories (for A)] into 
biological storage devices created for this purpose. This technology also 
allows one to transfer such memories into the brains of other people. A 
person, into whose brain such [other people’s (for Q and T) / artificial (for 
A)] memories are transferred, cannot distinguish such transferred memories 
from their own memories. Also, no available technologies can distinguish 
such memories from others. This technology at the moment is experimental 
and secret, but it is already sometimes used as an educational tool, since it 
provides an easy way to transfer knowledge that was memorized by another 
person. It is also sometimes used as a means to improve psychological well-
being by transferring pleasant [memories of other people (for Q and T) / 
artificial memories (for A)]. 
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Imagine that Albertas is a teenager who had a lot of [other people’s (for Q 
and T) / artificial (for A)] memories transferred into his brain in his 
childhood. Albertas does not know and has no reason whatsoever to suspect 
that such memory transfer was performed on him. [Not all his memories, 
however, are transferred memories of other people. Some of his memories 
are from the period before memory transfer. (only in T)] One of [the 
transferred (for Q and A) / such original (for T)] memories is about tasting 
rowan-berries in childhood. When someone asks Albertas whether he has 
ever tasted rowan-berries, Albertas replies with confidence: “Yes, I clearly 
remember eating rowan-berries when I was a child.” 
 
After reading the vignette, participants were asked to answer two questions about memory 
and knowledge on a six-point Likert scale, anchored at 1 (Completely disagree) and 6 
(Completely agree). The first question was “Do you agree that Albertas remembers that he 
has tasted rowan-berries when he was a child?” and the second one reads ‘knows’ instead of 
‘remembers’. 
Results. Results of the present study are presented in Figure 1. 
Remembers probes. In all three scenarios – quasi-memory, artificial memory, and true 
memory, one-sample t-tests indicated that participants’ agreement that Albertas remembers 
that he has tasted rowan-berries when he was a child was above the middle-point of the scale: 
for quasi-memory (M = 4.87, SD = 1.72, t(96) = 7.83, p < .001, d = 0.795); for artificial 
memory (M = 4.70, SD = 1.87, t(95) = 6.28, p < .001, d = 0.641); and for true memory (M = 
5.19, SD = 1.37, t(97) = 12.2, p < .001, d = 1.23). 
For knowledge probes, quasi-memories were not considered to be the basis for knowledge. 
One-sample t-test indicated that participants’ agreement that Albertas knows that he has 
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tasted rowan-berries when he was a child was below the middle-point of the scale in the 
quasi-memory scenario (M = 3.08, SD = 1.95, t(96) = 7.83, p = .037, d = 0.215). Responses 
were no different from the midpoint of the scale in other two cases: for artificial memory (M 
= 3.27, SD = 2.10, t(95) = 1.07, p = .287, d = 0.109); and for true memory (M = 3.61, SD = 
1.84, t(97) = 0.605, p = .547, d = 0.061). 
In all three cases, paired-sample t-tests indicated that scores on ‘remembers’ scale were 
higher than on ‘knows’ scale: for quasi-memory (M = 4.87, SD = 1.72 versus M = 3.08, SD = 
1.95,  t(96) = 7.83, p < .001, d = 0.579); for artificial memory (M = 4.70, SD = 1.87 versus M 
= 3.27, SD = 2.10, t(95) =4.08, p < .001, d = 0.417); and for true memory (M = 5.19, SD = 
1.37 versus M = 3.61, SD = 1.84, t(97) = 6.54, p < .001, d = 0.661). 
Independent-sample t-tests indicated that scores on the ‘remembers’ scale did not differ for 
quasi-memories (M = 4.87, SD = 1.72) and artificial memories (M = 4.70, SD = 1.87), t(191) 
= 0.65, p = .516, d = 0.094. Also, an independent-sample t-test indicated that scores on the 
‘remembers’ scale did not differ for quasi-memories and true memories (M = 5.19, SD = 
1.37), t(183) = 1.47, p = .143, d = 0.211. Levene’s test indicated unequal variances (F = 8.88, 
p = .003), so degrees of freedom were adjusted from 193 to 183. Also, an independent-
sample t-test indicated that scores on the ‘remembers’ scale were lower for artificial 
memories than for true memories, t(174) = 2.10, p = .037, d = 0.303. Levene’s test indicated 




Figure 1. Agreement of participants with whether the agent remembers and knows that he 
has tasted rowan-berries when he was a child. The black horizontal line indicates the middle 
of the scale (3.5). Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
Discussion. The main result of Study 1 is that study participants were willing to say that the 
agent ‘remembers’ both in case of artificial memory (violating the factivity constraint) and of 
quasi-memory (violating the strong previous awareness condition). 
 
Study 2. Dream memories 
One limitation of Study 1 is that it employs unusual science fiction scenarios. In the present 
study I attempted to use a much more mundane scenario of misidentified dream resulting in a 
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false memory. Unfortunately, it is not possible to come up with mundane scenarios to test the 
strong previous awareness condition, so Study 2 is limited to testing the factivity constraint. 
Participants. 203 online participants took part in a study (60% females, 37% males, 3% 
chose “prefer not to answer / other”; mean age: 30.4; age SD =  7.42; age range 18–60). 
Participants for this study (as well as for studies 3 and 4) were recruited via advertisements 
on several Lithuanian popular science Facebook pages. 
Materials. Three versions of a vignette were used that varied how much time has passed 
since the misidentified dream that resulted in a false memory. This was done in order to see 
whether participants will be more likely to say that the agent ‘has a memory’ in case of older 
false memories, the idea being that older false memories will be perceived as integrated into 
the agent’s mental economy to a larger extent. The vignettes read as follows: 
 
Six months ago [ten years ago; yesterday] Ona was attending Algis’ twentieth 
birthday party. Thinking of that party, Ona has a vivid image in her mind of Regina 
inadvertently spilling red wine all over Jonas, followed by an image of Regina’s 
horrified expression at the mishap, and of Jonas sitting on the grass by the drinks 
table, completely drenched. 
However, no such event in fact occurred during Algis’ birthday party. Instead, what 
happened was just that Ona, very excited about the party, on the same night had a 
dream of Jonas having wine spilled all over him, and she came to believe that this 
event occurred, not in her dream, but in reality. 
When today a friend asked Ona whether she attended Algis’ twentieth birthday party 
six months ago [ten years ago; yesterday], Ona replied: “Yes, I attended Algis’ 
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twentieth birthday party. Jonas was also there. I remember him having wine spilled all 
over him.”3 
 
After reading the vignette, participants were asked to indicate their agreement with the claim 
“Ona has a memory of Jonas having wine spilled all over him during a party” on a seven-
point Likert scale, anchored at 1 (Completely disagree) and 7 (Completely agree). 
Results 
Independent-sample t-tests indicated that scores on ‘has a memory of’ scale did not differ 
between groups: yesterday (M = 4.91, SD = 2.26) versus six months (M = 5.16, SD = 2.23):  
t(135) = .643, p = .521, d = .110; yesterday versus ten years (M = 4.82, SD = 2.20):  t(131) = 
.239, p = .812, d = .041; and six months versus ten years:  t(134) =.892, p = .374, d = .153. 
Thus participants were pooled for the subsequent analysis. 
One-sample t-test indicated that participants’ agreement with a claim “Ona has a memory of 
Jonas having wine spilled all over him during a party” was above the middle-point of the 
scale: M = 4.97, SD = 2.22, t(202) = 6.19, p < .001, d = 0.434. In fact, 7 (Completely agree) 
was a modal answer, covering 38% of cases. 
Discussion. Study 2 looked at the factivity constraint using a more mundane scenario. 
Participants tended to agree that misidentified dreams were memories (in violation of the 
factivity constraint). However, no support was found for the claim that the older is the 
misidentified dream, the more likely it is to be considered a case of memory. 
 
Study 3. Memories and experiences 
One potential issue with the previous studies is that participants may be answering that 
implanted memories in an individual are memories because her experience of remembering is 
                                               
3 This vignette is loosely based on a vignette developed by Philipp Rau.  
 11 
tantamount to the experience of remembering in a person with no implanted memories. And 
if people mean the experience of remembering rather than a memory (independent of its 
phenomenological profile), then the view that memory is factive or assumes a previous 
awareness condition is not refuted.4 Study 3 was designed to look into this possibility by 
giving participants a choice to indicate that what is described it is not a case of having a 
memory of an event but a case of having an experience of a sort that would be experienced 
by someone who indeed has a memory of such an event. 
Participants. 252 online participants took part in a study (65% females, 32% males, 3% 
chose “prefer not to answer / other”; mean age: 31.2; age SD =  8.22; age range 18–56). 
Materials. For the present study, Quasi-memory and Artificial memory vignettes from Study 
1 and Ona’s dream (‘six months ago’ version) vignette from Study 2 were used. After reading 
Quasi-memory and Artificial memory vignettes, participants were asked to make the 
following choice: 
 
Which of the following two descriptions is more suitable to describe this situation? 
 
1. Even though Albertas hadn’t tasted rowan-berries when he was a child, he has a 
memory of tasting rowan-berries. 
2. Albertas does not have a memory of tasting rowan-berries. He simply has an 
experience like the experience of someone who has such memory. 
 
Participants who received Ona’s dream vignette were separated into two groups. The two 
groups received the task with slightly different wording. Namely, two different synonymous 
Lithuanian words for ‘experience’ were used: ‘patiria’ for one group (Dream memory 1; the 
                                               
4 I would like to thank one of the reviewers for raising this issue. 
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same word was used in Quasi-memory and Artificial memory tasks) and ‘išgyvena’ for 
another one (Dream memory 2). The task read (with different Lithuanian words for 
‘experiencing’ for different conditions): 
 
Which of the following two descriptions is more suitable to describe this situation? 
 
1. Ona has a memory of Jonas having wine spilled all over him during a party, even 
though no such event in fact happened. 
2. Ona does not have a memory of Jonas having wine spilled all over him during a 
party. She simply has an experience like the experience of someone who has a 
memory of such event. 
 
As a result, there were four conditions (Quasi-memory, Artificial memory, and two variations 
of Ona’s dream), presented in between-subjects manner. 
Results. A chi-square test of goodness-of-fit was performed to determine whether the two 
options were equally preferred. In all four conditions, significantly more participants chose 
‘has a memory’ answer. Quasi-memories: X2 (1, N = 66) = 11.9, p < .001. 71% of participants 
chose ‘has a memory’ answer. Artificial memories: X2 (1, N = 60) = 19.3, p < .001. 78% of 
participants chose ‘has a memory’ answer. Dream memory 1: X2 (1, N = 63) = 7.0, p = .008. 
67% of participants chose ‘has a memory’ answer. Dream memory 2 results were exactly 
identical to results in Dream memory 1: X2 (1, N = 63) = 7.0, p = .008. 67% of participants 
chose ‘has a memory’ answer. Results of Study 3 are presented in Figure 2. 
Independent sample chi-square tests of association were performed to determine whether the 
response patterns to the four conditions differed. No differences between groups were 
observed, X2 (3, N = 252) = 2.68, p = .443. After pooling across conditions, a chi-square test 
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of goodness-of-fit was performed to determine whether the two options were equally 
preferred. Answers were not equally distributed in the population, X2 (1, N = 252) = 42.9, p < 
.001. Across all four conditions, 71% of participants chose ‘has a memory’ answer. 
 
Figure 2. Percent of participants who chose ‘has a memory’ answer. The black horizontal 
line indicates proportion of the answers that could be expected to obtain by chance alone 
(50%). 
 
Discussion. In all four conditions, participants were more likely to choose an option ascribing 
a memory of an event than an option ascribing only an experience of having a memory. 
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Study 4. Memories, money, and guns 
Study 4 was designed to look into another potential objection – namely, that non-factive 
memories are not memories in the same way as false money is not money or a false gun is not 
a gun. 
To this effect, Cheng and Werning write: 
In psychology, the adjective-noun combination “false memory” is often used 
to refer to a false mnemonic representation. The use of this phrase by 
psychologists is sometimes interpreted as if memory in psychology would not 
be regarded as factive. However, this conclusion would be justified only if 
“false” were an intersective adjective, for which the inference from “x is AN” 
to “x is N” is valid. The more plausible interpretation, we think, is that “false” 
in “false memory” is a privative adjective like “false” in “false money” or 
“fake” in “fake gun”. For privative adjectives, the inference is not valid: false 
money is not money, a fake gun is not a gun and, likewise, false memory is 
not a case of memory. (1351, note 1) 
I decided to run a study to look into this. 
Participants. 455 online participants took part in a study (63% females, 34% males, 3% 
chose “prefer not to answer / other”; mean age: 30.8; age SD =  7.88; age range 18–60). All 
participants who took part in either Study 2 or Study 3 (no participants overlap between 
studies 2 and 3) also took part in Study 4. Study 4 was presented on a separate page and 
participants were not allowed to return to the previous study.  
Materials. Participants were asked to indicate on the seven-point Likert scale (anchored at 1 
(Completely disagree) and 7 (Completely agree)) the extent to which they agree or disagree 
with each of the following three claims: 
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A false memory is still a memory. 
A fake – toy – gun is still a gun.5 
False money is still money. 
 
Results. One-sample t-tests were conducted for all three scenarios – memory, gun, and 
money. In the case of memory, the mean agreement was above the middle-point of the scale: 
(M = 4.47, SD = 2.08, t(454) = 4.83, p < .001, d = 0.226). In the case of gun, mean agreement 
did not differ from the middle-point of the scale: (M = 3.96, SD = 2.17, t(454) = 0.39, p = 
.697, d = 0.018). While in the case of money, mean agreement was below the middle-point of 
the scale: (M = 2.96, SD = 2.07, t(454) = 10.71, p < .001, d = 0.502). 
Paired-samples t-tests indicated that scores for ‘memory’ were higher than for ‘gun’: t(454) = 
4.73, p < .001, d = 0.222) and ‘money’: t(454) = 14.1, p < .001, d = 0.659). 
Modal answer was 7 (Completely agree) for memories (selected by 22% of participants) and 
1 (Completely disagree) for guns (20%) and money (38%). 
Discussion. In previous studies, I found that recalling other people’s memories or artificial 
memories is considered to be ‘remembering’ or ‘having a memory’. This additional brief 
study suggests that, contrary to what Cheng and Werning suggested, study participants were 
willing to agree that false memories are memories. This is in line with other studies reported 
in this report, where participants were willing to say that the agent remembers in situations 
where factivity constraint on memory was violated. However, one limitation of Study 4 is 
that – in contrast to Studies 1, 2, and 3 – the study was conducted on study participants who 
already had taken part in another study on memory. 
 
                                               
5 The word ‘toy’ was added to the statement about the gun because otherwise ‘fake gun’ in Lithuanian language 
would likely be interpreted as ‘an exact copy of a given gun’ (e.g. a counterfeit but indistinguishable from the 
original and fully functional copy of an old gun produced in order to sell it to a gullible guns collector). 
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General discussion 
The present set of studies suggests that the factivity constraint and the strong previous 
awareness condition are not essential features of our ordinary use of ‘remembering’ and 
‘having a memory of’. Concerning the factivity constraint, artificial memory and 
misidentified dream memory vignettes involve violations of factivity, and in all these cases 
study participants tended to agree that the agent ‘remembers’ (Study 1) or ‘has a memory’ 
(Studies 2 and 3). The fact that study participants tended to agree that the agent ‘remembers’ 
(Study 1) and ‘has a memory’ (Study 3; Quasi-memory condition) in cases of having 
implanted other people’s memories, suggests that the ordinary notion of memory is not bound 
by the strong previous awareness condition either. 
These findings, of course, should be taken as only the first preliminary and very limited step 
in the direction of better understanding of constraints that rule our ordinary notion of 
remembering. Among limitations of this study, I would like to stress the very limited set of 
experimental vignettes used, the fact that it is unclear whether the results would generalize to 
other languages than Lithuanian, as well as that some of the vignettes were based on science 
fiction scenarios. 
In summary, the data provided in this report provide some evidence to motivate skepticism 
concerning whether the factivity constraint and the strong previous awareness condition are 
essential features of our ordinary use of ‘remember’. 
There is also an intriguing possibility that the uses of ‘remember’ documented in this report 
reflect a relatively recent conceptual development that can perhaps be associated with 
exposure to such ideas in pop culture. The present methods are not suitable to address this 
question and one would rather need to use historical linguistic corpora to see whether they 
contain examples of non-factive uses of ‘remembers’ or ‘has a memory of’. 
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